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This policy brief speaks to the military effects of lethal autonomous weapons systems 
raised in the GGE chairpersonÕs food-for-thought paper (CCW/GGE1/2017/WP1). In 
particular, it addresses the following questions: Could the potential deployment of 
LAWS lower the threshold of use of force? Could it enhance asymmetric deployment of 
force or covert use of force? 
The brief provides answers to these questions in two steps. First, it argues that 
international legal regulations governing the use of force, centred around the general 
prohibition of the use-of force, have played a significant role in maintaining 
international peace and security in the UN-Charter era. This role is based both on 
statesÕ shared sense of being bound by these rules and the certainty of expectations they 
thus provide. Second, the development of LAWS threatens this certainty of expectations 
because they are likely to introduce more Ògrey areasÓ in how states interpret 
international law.  
We argue that LAWS will follow into the ÒfootstepsÓ of evolving state practice 
associated with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones. Over the past ten years, 
state justifications surrounding the use of UAVs have significantly increased the number 
of Ògrey areasÓ (that is contested areas) in international law on the use-of-force by 
introducing competing readings of such vital standards as attribution, imminence, and 
necessity. This produces uncertainty in evaluating state conduct, lowers thresholds 
towards using military force, and hollows out established international legal standards. 
In short, it threatens the legal-normative order sustaining international peace and 
security. 
  






Regulations governing the use of force and their effects on international peace and 
security 
A dense network of international regulations governs the use of force. At the heart of 
this system are provisions in the UN Charter, chief among them the general prohibition 
on the use of force. This signifies an important commitment of states to refrain from the 
threat or the use of force in their conduct with each other. The only two exceptions to 
this prohibition are situations of self-defence and operations mandated by the UN 
Security Council. While these legal stipulations are imperfect in the sense of not having 
been consistently observed, they have contributed to significantly reducing the number 
of inter-state wars after 1945. International law has this effect on international peace 
and security because it reduces uncertainty when it comes to state behaviour. It 
provides a framework for state conduct that states have agreed upon voluntarily, and 
offers a reliable set of clear and specified rules for states to comply with. This provides 
common standards regulating the use of force, and above all emphasizes that force 
should only ever be used as a last resort. 
Emerging grey areas in the law on the use of force and lowering thresholds 
This comparatively clear international legal system has come under strain with the 
emergence of threats posed by non-state actors. With the emergence of terrorist groups 
operating across national borders, states sought to apply use of force standards in 
different, and often more permissible, ways. In particular, this concerns the use of 
UAVs for the targeted killing of terrorist suspects. Here, states have explicitly and 
implicitly challenged at least two key standards of international law governing the use 
of force: 
The attribution standard: This affirms that the use of force against terrorist suspects is 
only legal if there is a clear link of support or sponsorship between the host state and 
the terrorist suspects. Yet, states have used force against Al Qaeda suspects and the IS 
on the territory of states that are clearly not linked to the activity of these groups. This is 
a significant departure from established understandings. Yet, these new interpretations 
are not uniform. Some states, for example, argue that the use of force is permissible if 
the ÒhostÓ state is Òunwilling or unableÓ to counter the threat posed by terrorist actors 
themselves. But this phrase is by no means consistently used and points to an 
inherently speculative and subjective mode of assessment. 
The imminence standard in the context of self-defence: The UN Charter specifically 
allows states to use force in self-defence Òafter an armed attack has occurredÓ and states 
have likewise supported self-defence in case of imminent armed attacks. In the context 






of using military force against terrorist suspects, imminence has been largely separated 
from its common temporal meaning. Instead, it has been conflated with a group 
identity of terrorist suspects. In other words, all ÒmembersÓ of terrorist groups count as 
imminent threats because the modus operandi of terrorist groups is constantly planning 
attacks. This reading completely de-links imminence (or necessity, another vital 
principle regulating the use of force) from a case-by-case assessment. Even a case-by-
case assessment could, in any case, not be openly contested due to secrecy and the 
lack of transparency surrounding current targeting practice.  
These different readings cannot be captured in the language of international law 
because they are neither written down nor part of customary international law (there is 
neither consistent state practice nor a consistently stated belief in the applicability of a 
particular rule). States have produced justifications for their conduct, typically based on 
broad interpretations of international law. Taken together, this has lead to the 
emergence of a series of grey areas in the international law governing the use of force, 
putting the framework under a great deal of pressure. There is now considerably less 
agreement among states about the precise legal content of core standards such as 
attribution and imminence than 10 years ago. What is clear is that these grey areas 
lower thresholds towards using force. A lack of clarity results in a highly permissive 
environment for using force: justifications for its use can more ÒeasilyÓ be found within 
these increasingly elastic, contested areas of international law. 
LAWS in the context of existing legal grey areas 
These developments set the parameters in which the current discussion on LAWS takes 
place. This has four effects that are of interest to the debate on LAWS at the CCW: 
First, the emergence of LAWS advances the technological sophistication of UAVs. 
Considering LAWS along the spectrum of autonomy, systems to be used in air are 
among the most sophisticated category of LAWS in development. These resemble 
current UAVs closely but come with more refined autonomous capabilities. It is 
therefore likely that such systems will be used in similar ways as UAVs. They will 
hence follow into the footsteps of continuing and expanding current use of force 
practices that have already made the use of force more commonplace. This has 
significant effects on the general prohibition of the use of force as well as the wider use 
of force standards it stands for. In a system that makes the use of force more normal and 
more likely, international peace and security is threatened.  
Second, perceived advantages associated with LAWS could exacerbate this 
development and make the resort to the use of force even more probable. Like UAVs, 






using LAWS carries no risk for military personnel. However, unlike UAVs whose 
communication links make them slow to respond to attacks and at risk of jamming, 
LAWS could ÒthinkÓ for themselves on the battlefield, rendering them more effective 
than UAVs could ever be. These effectiveness considerations can become a push factor 
for deploying LAWS rather than UAVs in counter-terrorist operations. We can therefore 
assume that use of force thresholds will be further lowered by LAWS in building and 
expanding on current legal grey areas in their usage. This will make it increasingly 
difficult to use legal standards in concrete terms and threatens the very tenets of the 
international legal system. 
Third, we have seen how the use of UAVs has shaped and continues to shape the 
interpretation of legal regulations on the use of force. When states deploy weapons 
systems with increasing levels of autonomy, this will lead to new considerations about 
what are ÒappropriateÓ readings of current legal standards and, more generally, novel 
standards of when and how using force is ÒappropriateÓ. As we have seen in the 
context of UAVs, these standards may turn into de facto norms evolving outside of legal 
frameworks and formal processes of norm-setting. The various potential deployments 
of LAWS therefore become important sites where de facto norms governing the use of 
force emerge. Previous weapons technologies, such as submarines, demonstrate this 
trend. Once established, these de facto norms decrease the likelihood of banning 
LAWS comprehensively but also erode the global normative order by permissively 
reinterpreting use of force rules.  
Fourth, these arguments are of growing relevance when considering the increasing 
scope of autonomy LAWS may have. If we assume that more and more functions 
related to selecting and engaging potential targets for the use of force will be 
delegated to such systems, this renders decision-making on the use of force 
increasingly opaque. Already, target acquisition for UAVs relies heavily on signals 
generated by intelligence readings based on algorithms scanning masses of data that is 
not accessible to human reasoning. Autonomous machinic solutions are used to sift 
through the vast amounts of sensory data gathered by UAVs and thereby set the 
parameters for what military actors do. While humans remain in control of the force 
release decision, the impenetrable process of generating the data for it makes it hard for 
experts and decision-makers to question the output. Until the international community 
agrees on a consensus definition of LAWS, autonomy and/or the degree of acceptable 
human supervisory control, these developments will continue to go unchallenged. 
